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The International Civil Aviation
Organization is the Appropriate
Jurisdiction to Settle Hushkit Dispute
Between the United States and the
European Union
I. Introduction
On March 14, 2000, the United States filed a complaint with
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) against the
nations that make up the European Union (EU) over an EU
regulation that prohibits the introduction of aircraft fitted with
hushkits into Europe after May 2000.' The U.S. alleges that the
EU's regulation is discriminatory against non-EU countries.2 The
U.S. further alleges that the EU did not fully evaluate the impact
the regulation would have on the environment, nor its effect on
aircraft manufacturers and operators.' Finally, the U.S. alleges that
the EU's regulation does not focus on noise reduction as the
regulation's preamble asserts.4
The EU's answer to the U.S. complaint rejects the ICAO as
the forum for the arbitration of this dispute The EU's answer goes
on to assert that the U.S. has failed to adequately negotiate with the
EU over this dispute and has failed to pursue avenues for dispute
resolution outside the ICAO (such as the European Court of
Justice). The EU's answer further asserts that the United States'
requested remedy falls outside the ICAO's authority.6 The U.S.
1. Press Release, RAPID, Actions Against Noise Nuisance In the Airports:
The EU Deeply Regrets the US Decision to File Article 84 Action With ICAO
(Mar. 15, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Actions Against Noise Nuisance].
2. United States Believes Hushkit Ban is Unsound Policy, WORLD AIRPORT
WEEK, Aug. 22, 2000, at 1.
3. Id. at 1.
4. Id. at 1.
5. European Union Rejects ICAO as Forum to Resolve Noise Dispute,
WORLD AIRPORT WEEK, Aug. 29, 2000, at 1.
6. Id. at 2.
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countered by stating that the EU's answer to its complaint was "a
weak attempt to delay the inevitable."'
What follows is a review of the ICAO Convention on noise
reduction; the disputed EU regulation; the effects this regulation
could have on U.S. aircraft manufacturers and operators; and a
detailed look at the three-part charge the EU made in answer to the
United States' complaint. This review will demonstrate three
things. First, the U.S. has attempted to negotiate a settlement but
has met only resistance from the EU. Second, any attempt to
resolve this dispute in the European Court of Justice would only
lead to further delays. Lastly, the ICAO has jurisdiction and is the
fairest tribunal in which to arbitrate a resolution to this dispute.
II. The Regulations and Its Effects
This dispute centers on the way the EU attempted to codify
the intent of the ICAO Convention on aircraft noise reduction
(known as Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation).8 The disputed EU regulation is Council Regulation
(EC) No. 925/1999 of 29 April 1999.9 To determine the best forum
for settling this dispute, one must look closely at the ICAO noise
standards and recommended practices, Council Regulation (EC)
No. 925/1999, and the effects the Council Regulation would have on
the U.S.
A. ICAO Convention on Aircraft Noise Reduction
With the advent of jet aircraft and the resulting rapid increase
in air traffic, airport noise became a concern for all nations enjoying
the expansion of air travel.' ° The nations experiencing this increase
in aircraft noise met to determine how to address this new
byproduct of progress. This international conference, held in
London in November 1966, was known as the International
Conference on the Reduction of Noise and Disturbance Caused by
Civil Aircraft (commonly referred to as the London Noise
7. European Union Rejects ICAO as Forum for Hushkit Dispute, WORLD
AIRPORT WEEK, Aug. 18, 2000, at 2.
8. Int'l Civil Aviation Org., International Standards and Recommended
Practices; Environmental Protection; Annex 16 to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, U.N. Doc. ICAO/E/P1/4500 (1993).
9. Council Regulation (EC) No 925/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 115) 1-4.
10. See Jeffrey Goh, Problems of Transnational Regulation: A Case Study of
Aircraft Noise Regulation In the European Community, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 277, 280-81
(1995).
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Conference).' The London Noise Conference was not an ICAO
conference, but did make conclusions about the problem of aircraft
noise that were introduced to the ICAO at the Fifth Air Navigation
Conference of the ICAO held in Montreal in November 1967.12
The ICAO adopted a resolution to address aircraft noise in 1968 at
the Sixteenth Session of the Assembly in Buenos Aires, entitled
"A16-3: Aircraft Noise in the Vicinity of Airports."'13  The
resolution identified the problems and created a framework for the
ICAO to address those problems.' In response to the direction of
Resolution A16-3, the ICAO convened its first meeting on Aircraft
Noise in the Vicinity of Aerodromes in Montreal in 1969." This
meeting created the International Standards and Recommended
Practices for Aircraft Noise published in Annex 16 To The
Convention on International Civil Aviation (CICA), entitled
Environmental Protection. 6 Annex 16 contains two volumes, with
volume one containing the provisions dealing with aircraft noise
and volume two containing the provisions dealing with aircraft
engine emissions." Annex 16 established the standards and
recommended procedures for all contracting states to follow.
11. Int'l Civil Aviation Org., supra note 8, at v.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The relevant parts of Resolution A16-3 are:
Whereas the problem of aircraft noise is so serious in the vicinity of many
of the world's airports that public reaction is mounting to a degree that
gives cause for great concern and requires urgent solution;
Whereas the noise that concerns the public and civil aviation today is
being caused by increase in traffic of existing aircraft;
Whereas the introduction of future aircraft types could increase and
aggravate this noise unless action is taken to alleviate the situation;...
THE ASSEMBLY RESOLVES to instruct the Council:
1) to call an international conference within the machinery of ICAO as
soon as practicable, bearing in mind the need for adequate preparation,
to consider the problem of aircraft noise in the vicinity of airports;
2) to establish international specifications and associated guidance
material relating to aircraft noise;
3) to include, in appropriate existing Annexes and other relevant ICAO
documents and possibly in a separate Annex on noise, such material as
the description and methods of measurement of aircraft noise and
suitable limitations on the noise caused by aircraft that is of concern to
communities in the vicinity of airports...
Id.
15. Id.
16. Int'l Civil Aviation Org., supra note 8, at v.
17. We will concern ourselves only with Volume one of Annex 16 of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944).
18. Contracting states are those nations that have signed and agreed to the
CICA.
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The ICAO was given authority to adopt international
standards and recommended practices by Article 37 of the CICA,
adopted in Chicago in 1944."9 The force of the standards and
recommendations are defined in Annex 16. Standards are defined
in Annex 16 as "[any specification ... which is recognized as
necessary for the safety or regularity of international air navigation
and to which Contracting States will conform in accordance with
the Convention.... ,20 Annex 16 goes on to define a recommended
practice as "[any specification... which is recognized as desirable
in the interest of safety... to which Contracting States will
endeavour [sic] to conform in accordance with the Convention."'"
In other words, Contracting States are only required to make
every effort to follow recommended practices, but are required to
follow the standards, unless it is impossible for them to do so.
Knowing what is expected of each contracting state is important
when looking at the specific provisions of Annex 16 and how each
contracting state implements those provisions.
The European Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 was
written with the intent to enforce the standards established for
subsonic jet aircraft contained in Annex 16 to the CICA, third
edition (July 1993).22 This Chapter of Annex 16 defines what type
of aircraft the standards apply to, how to measure the noise level,
where to measure the noise level, the maximum noise levels, and
the test procedures. The detailed method for evaluating aircraft
noise defined in Chapter 3 is addressed in great detail in Appendix
19. Id. The relevant parts of Article 37 of the Convention on International
Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944) are:
Each contracting State undertakes to collaborate in securing the highest
practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures,
and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary
services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve
air navigation. To this end the International Civil Aviation Organization
shall adopt and amend from time to time, as may be necessary,
international standards and recommended practices and procedures
dealing with:
(b) Characteristics of airports and landing areas;
(c) Rules of the air and air traffic control practices;
(d) Licensing of operating and mechanical personnel;
(e) Airworthiness of aircraft;
(f) Registration and identification of aircraft;
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 37, 61 Stat. 1180,
1190, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 320.
20. Int'l Civil Aviation Org., supra note 8, at vi.
21. Id.
22. Council Regulation, supra note 9.
23. Int'l Civil Aviation Org., supra note 8, at 5-8.
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2 of Volume I of Annex 16.24 A closer look at how Annex 16
defines and measures aircraft noise is important, as it is one of the
critical elements of this dispute.
As stated above, Chapter 3 defines the unit of measure and the
maximum level of noise for each aircraft type, under certain
conditions. Chapter 3 states that "[t]he noise evaluation measure
shall be the effective perceived noise level in EPNdB as described
in Appendix 2.,25 Chapter 3 also gives the maximum noise levels, at
several measuring points, that an aircraft shall not exceed.26 This is
significant to the dispute because the European Union regulation
uses engine by-pass ratio as the measure for compliance with
Chapter 3 standards.
The Chapter 3 standards pertain to aircraft applying for
airworthiness certificates, which are required before any aircraft
design can carry passengers.' Airworthiness certification is also
21
required when an aircraft undergoes certain types of modification.
One such modification is a new or modified engine design added to
an existing aircraft design. In order to meet the Chapter 3
standards, many older aircraft designs, such as the Boeing 707, 727,
and McDonnell Douglas DC 8 and DC 9 aircraft, were either re-
engined or modified with hushkits.3 The U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) certified these aircraft as meeting the
Chapter 3 standards.3 Appendix 2 of Annex 16 to the CICA notes
that "[t]he instructions and procedures given in the method are
clearly delineated to ensure uniformity during compliance tests, and
to permit comparison between tests of various types of aircraft
conducted in various geographical locations."'32 Therefore, since the
FAA followed the instructions and procedures delineated in Annex
16, all contracting states should recognize those results and not
discriminate against those aircraft. To understand how the EU
regulation could discriminate against American manufacturers, and
aircraft operators, one must fully understand the regulation itself.
24. Id. at 61-92.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 6.
27. Council Regulation, supra note 9, at 2.
28. Int'l Civil Aviation Org., supra note 8, at 5.
29. ADRIANUS D. GROENEWEGE, COMPENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION 565 (1996/1997).
30. Actions Against Noise Nuisance, supra note 1.
31. Id.
32. Int'l Civil Aviation Org., supra note 8, at 61.
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B. The European Union Regulation
The dispute between the U.S. and the EU centers on the effect
the European Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 has on
American aircraft manufacturers and operators. While the stated
purpose of the regulation is to reduce aircraft noise around airports,
the effects of its provisions are actually targeted at non-EU
members and will do little to reduce aircraft noise within Europe.
European Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 begins by
defining and limiting the types of aircraft it is applicable to. EC
Regulation No. 925/1999 states that it applies to "the registration
and operation within the Community of certain types of civil
subsonic jet aeroplanes which have been modified and recert-
ificated as meeting the standards of volume I, Part II, Chapter 3 of
Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, third
edition (July 1993)."" 3 In other words, this regulation does not
apply to aircraft that were designed and originally certified to meet
CICA Annex 16 standards. However, it does apply to aircraft that
were designed and certified under previous standards and
subsequently modified to meet the newer and tougher standards.
The regulation goes on to state the background facts that
established the need for this new legislation.
The background portion of the regulation begins by outlining
the worldwide effect air travel has had and how the transportation
policy of the EU directs them to address those effects. 4 Next, the
factual framework explains that the people within the EU should
not be subjected to noise levels that are detrimental to their health
or life, and then identifies older aircraft that have been modified as
being both significantly louder than newer aircraft and the cause for
33. Council Regulation, supra note 9, at 1.
34. The relevant portions of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 are:
Acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189c of the
Treaty(3),
(1) Whereas one of the key objectives of the common transport policy is
sustainable mobility whereas such a policy can be defined as a global
approach which aims at ensuring both the effective functioning of the
Community's transport systems and the protection of the environment;
whereas it is appropriate to take technical measures which contribute to
the achievement of sustainable mobility;
(2) Whereas the Commission communication on the future development
of the common transport policy: a global framework to the construction
of a Community framework for sustainable mobility explicitly refers to
the introduction of a non-addition rule for the noisiest aeroplanes...
[Vol. 20:2
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most of the detrimental aircraft noise.35 The regulation explains
how the rule prohibiting the introduction of additional modified
aircraft maintains the current status quo of aircraft noise, and that
national borders within the European Union prevent the European
Council from taking further steps to reduce aircraft noise.36 The
final portion of the framework for this regulation states that in
order to maintain fair competition, the regulation must apply to
non-EU countries flying aircraft into the EU, but it also recognizes
that this regulation can not affect aircraft operated outside the
35. The relevant portions of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 are:
(3) Whereas the fifth action programme of 1992 on the environment, the
general approach of which was endorsed by the Council and the
representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting
within the Council, in their resolution of 1 February 1993(4) envisages
further legislative measures aimed at reducing noise emissions from
aeroplanes; whereas the said programme lays down the objective that no
person should be exposed to noise levels which endanger health and
quality of life;
(4) Whereas the growth in air transport activities at Community airports
is increasingly subject to environmental constraints; whereas the
operation of less noisy aeroplanes at these airports can contribute to a
better use of available airport capacity;
(5) Whereas older types of aeroplanes modified to improve their noise
certification level have a noise performance which is significantly worse,
mass for mass, than that of modern types of aeroplanes originally
certificated to meet the standards of Volume I, Part II, Chapter 3 of
Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, third edition
(July 1993); whereas such modifications prolong the life of an aeroplane
that would normally have been retired; whereas such modifications tend
to worsen the gaseous emissions performance and fuel bum of earlier
technology aero engines; whereas aeroplanes may be re-engined to
achieve a noise performance comparable to that of those originally
certificated to meet Chapter 3 requirements...
Id.
36. The relevant portions of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 are:
(6) Whereas a rule which prohibits the addition of those older modified
types of aeroplanes to Member States' registers as from 1 April 1999 can
be considered as a protective measure aimed at preventing a
deterioration of the noise situation around Community airports as well as
improving the situation regarding fuel burn and gaseous emissions;
(7) Whereas in a Community without internal frontiers it is appropriate
to exclude from this non-addition rule aeroplanes entered in any Member
State's register prior to 1 April 1999;
(8) Whereas, in view of existing Community legislation on aeroplane
noise, the present initiative needs to be taken at Community level by
binding Community rules;
(9) Whereas a non-addition rule, and a non-operation rule with an
appropriate transition period, combines technical feasibility with
environmental benefits without imposing an undue economic burden...
Id. at 1-2.
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EU.37 This factual framework laid out in EC Regulation No.
925/1999 establishes the political as well as geographical restraints
imposed upon the European Council when they drafted the
regulation.
With the framework in place, EC Regulation No. 925/1999
then defines its objective; which aircraft are covered; how the
aircraft will be limited; and the exceptions to those limitations. EC
Regulation No. 925/1999 states that its objective "is to lay down
rules to prevent deteriorations in the overall noise impact in the
Community of recertificated civil subsonic jet aeroplanes while at
the same time limiting other environmental damage. '" 8  The
Regulation defines recertificated civil subsonic jet aeroplanes as
aircraft originally certified under the older standards of Annex 16
to the CICA (known as chapter 2) and modified to meet the
Chapter 3 standards of Annex 16.3' The regulation prohibits the
37. The relevant portions of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 are:
(10) Whereas it is necessary to minimise [sic] possible distortions of
competition by establishing equivalent requirements applicable to
aeroplanes registered in third countries; whereas, since the Community
has no competence over third-country registers, that objective can be
achieved only by restricting the operation of non-complying aeroplanes
registered as from 1 April 1999 in third countries; whereas the date for
introducing such restrictions should take account of the final cut-off date
for the operation of Chapter 2 aeroplanes as provided for in Council
Directive 92/14/EEC of 2 March 1992 on the limitation of the operation
of aeroplanes covered by Volume I, Part II, Chapter 2 of Annex 16 to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation, second edition 1998(1), as
well as the extent of the non-addition provisions for Chapter 2 aeroplanes
as laid down in Council Directive 89/629/EEC of 4 December 1989 on the
limitation of noise emission from civil subsonic jet aeroplanes(2);
(11) Whereas, in order to ensure equal treatment of aeroplanes
regardless of their country of registration, non-complying aeroplanes in
the registers of Member States should also be stopped from operating in
accordance with the terms imposed on non-complying aeroplanes in the
registers of third countries;
(12) Whereas, given that the main objective of the measure is to limit
noise at Community airports, aeroplanes may be exempted from the
non-addition and non-operation rules when they are not operated in the
Community territory; whereas, in order for these rules to produce their
full environmental benefits, temporary exemptions may be possible only
for operations of an exceptional nature;
(13) Whereas the provisions of this Regulation shall not be implemented
in the overseas departments referred to in Article 227(2) of the Treaty, in
view of their geographical location...
Id. at 2.
38. Council Regulation, supra note 9, at 2.
39. The relevant portions of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 are:
(2) 'recertificated civil subsonic jet aeroplane' shall mean a civil subsonic
jet aeroplane initially certificated to Chapter 2 or equivalent standards, or
initially not noise-certificated which has been modified to meet Chapter 3
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registration of recertificated civil subsonic jet aircraft after 1 April
1999, and any aircraft not so registered cannot operate within the
EU after 1 April 2002.' 0 The regulation also prohibits non-EU
members from operating recertificated civil subsonic jet aircraft
within the EU after 1 April 2002 unless they were registered in the
non-EU nation prior to 1 April 1999 and operated within the EU
from 1 April 1995 to 1 April 1999.41 Finally, the regulation has a
provision to allow EU nations the power to grant exceptions to this
regulation for certain specified reasons stated in the regulation.
Because of the dispute with the United States over this regulation,
the EU changed the effective date of EC Regulation No. 925/1999
from 1 April 1999 to 4 May 2000.4
standards either directly through technical measures or indirectly through
operational restrictions; civil subsonic jet aeroplanes which initially could
only be dual-certificated to the standards of Chapter 3 by means of
weight restrictions, have to be considered as recertificated aeroplanes;
civil subsonic jet aeroplanes which have been modified to meet Chapter 3
standards by being completely re-enginged [sic] with engines having a by-
pass ratio of three or more are not to be considered as recertificated
aeroplanes;
(3) 'Chapter 2'and 'Chapter 3'shall mean the noise standards as defined
in Volume I, Part II, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 respectively of Annex 16 to
the Convention on International Civil Aviation, third edition (July
1993)...
Id. at 2-3.
40. The relevant portions of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 are:
1. Recertificated civil subsonic jet aeroplanes shall not be registered in
the national register of a Member state as from 1 April 1999.
2. paragraph 1 shall not affect civil subsonic jet aeroplanes which were
already on the register of any Member State on 1 April 1999 and have
been registered in the Community ever since....
4. Recertificated civil subsonic jet aeroplanes which are on the registers
of Member States may not be operated at airports in the territory of the
Community as from 1 April 2002 unless they have been operated in that
territory before 1 April 1999.
Id. at 3.
41. The relevant portions of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 are:
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Directive 92/14/EEC and in
particular Article 2(2) thereof, as from 1 April 2002 recertificated civil
subsonic jet aeroplanes registered in a third country shall not be allowed
to operate at airports in the territory of the Community unless the
operator of such aeroplanes can prove that they were on the register of
that third country on 1 April 1999 and prior to that date have been
operated, between 1 April 1995 and 1 April 1999, into the territory of the
Community.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Andy Chuter, EU Seeks To Buy Time In USA Hushkit Fight, FLIGHT
INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 5,2000.
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While the stated purpose of EC Regulation No. 925/1999 is to
reduce the effects of noise that is detrimental to the health and life
of the citizens of EU members, it fails to meet that lofty purpose.
The regulation does not eliminate the older modified aircraft; it
only prevents more of them from being introduced into the EU.
Therefore, the only way for there to be a reduction of noise caused
by these older aircraft is for these aircraft to lose their economic
viability in that market and to be retired. Since all of these older
modified aircraft were designed and built in the same era, they will
lose their economic viability at the same time in a particular market
regardless of which country operates them now. EC Regulation
No. 925/1999 states that while these aircraft do meet the noise
standards in Annex 16 to the CICA on account of their
modifications, it qualifies them by stating that "mass for mass"
these modified aircraft have a "noise performance which is signif-
icantly worse... than that of modern types of aeroplanes .... "44
The regulation further deviates from Chapter 3 of Annex 16 by
using an engine by-pass ratio of 3 instead of the noise limit measure
of EPNdB as defined in Appendix 2 of Annex 16.4' By-pass ratio is
the ratio of the volume of air that enters a jet engine and goes
around (by-passes) the combustion chamber over the volume of air
that goes through the thrust producing combustion chamber. 6 This
change has the effect of altering the standard for meeting the noise
limits from a performance-based standard to a design-based
standard that was not agreed to by all the contracting states to the
CICA.47 This design-based standard for measuring aircraft noise
has a disproportionate and discriminatory effect on American
manufacturers and aircraft operators.
C. The Effect Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 Has on
United States Manufacturers and Aircraft Operators
EC Regulation No. 925/1999 has a broad and far reaching
effect on American aircraft manufacturers and operators. This
regulation has already affected the value of aircraft fleets owned by
U.S. airlines and aircraft lessors. The regulation has abrogated the
44. Council Regulation, supra note 9, at 1.
45. Id. at 2.
46. European Union Ban on Aircraft "Hush Kits" Before the House Transpor.
and Infrastructure Comm. Aviation Subcomm., 105th Cong. (1999) (Prepared
Statement of Ambassador David L. Aaron on Behalf of the U.S. Department of
Commerce U.S. Department of State Federal Aviation Administration)
[hereinafter European Union Ban Statement].
47. United States Believes Hushkit Ban is Unsound Policy, supra note 2, at 1.
[Vol. 20:2
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ICAO noise standard that aircraft manufacturers and airlines relied
upon in making long-term investments. Finally, it arbitrarily
discriminates against aircraft operators outside the EU.
Aircraft operators invest millions of dollars in aircraft that
have a useful life of thirty years and require about twenty-two of
those years to pay them off.' Thus aircraft operators must look far
into the future when making investment decisions. While the full
effect of the regulation will not take place until 2002, a couple of
years are an exceedingly short period of time when you are
planning fleet compositions ten to twenty years into the future. The
regulation is affecting the aircraft operators' ability to obtain
financing for hushkits or engines that do not have a 3-to-1 by-pass
ratio required by the EC regulation. An example of this is Omega
Air, which has not been able to secure financing for over $1 billion
worth of Pratt & Whitney engines.49 Pratt & Whitney has also
experienced canceled orders for hushkit and engine spare parts
estimated at $515 million." As of the end of 1998 there were 1,850
aircraft in the American aircraft fleet that were or could have been
modified with hushkits or replacement engines whose total asset
value was approximately $10 billion."' It has been estimated that
the value of these aircraft has decreased by five percent because of
the EC regulation. 2 That loss in value has affected the balance
sheets of aircraft operators, hindering their ability to obtain capital
for current and future operations." The EU's unilateral change in
aircraft noise standards has affected the aircraft industry as a whole
and in particular the American aircraft industry.
The aviation industry is a global industry affecting the
economy, industry and people of every nation. Because of this
global impact, the United Nations established the ICAO to set
standards and procedures that are universal. Without ICAO
standards and procedures, there would be far too many regulations
making it economically impossible for aircraft operators to operate
throughout the world. This EC regulation is a prime example of
what nationalistic regulations can do to disrupt the international
aircraft industry.
48. Gerald L. Dillingham, Aviation and the Environment-Airport Operations
and Future Growth Present Environmental Challenges, GAO Rep. No. 00-153 B-
283109, at 13 (2000).
49. European Union Ban Statement, supra note 46, at 4.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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The EC regulation establishes a standard different from the
ICAO standard without evaluating the new standards impact on the
environment or aircraft operators." The requirement that aircraft
operated within the EU must use engines with a 3-to-1 by-pass ratio
is discriminatory against non-EU aircraft manufacturers. Most of
the aircraft that do not meet this standard are aircraft that were
manufactured in the U.S., such as Boeing 727s, 737s, 747s, and
DC9s 5 It also affects American manufacturers of hushkits such as
FedEx, Nordam, AvAero and ABS. 6 Interestingly enough, the 3-
to-1 by-pass ratio standard set by the EC regulation allows the
operation of the Rolls-Royce-manufactured Tay 650 that has a by-
pass ratio of 3.1-to-1 .17 Rolls-Royce is a corporation headquartered
in the EU. While this regulation may have an effect on noise
pollution, its main purpose is to increase the value of EU
manufactured aircraft and their components at the expense of their
American competitors.
III. Avenues to Resolution
Since there is no question that the EU regulation in dispute
will have a negative impact on American aircraft operators and
American manufacturers, the next question to be answered is how
the United States and the EU should go about resolving this
dispute. The United States believes that the ICAO, under Article
84 of the Chicago Convention, is the proper forum, and has filed a
complaint with the ICAO. The EU believes that negotiations or
use of a regional court, like the European Court of Justice, should
be given a chance before the dispute is sent to the ICAO for
settlement.58 The EU also believes that the ICAO complaint filed
by the U.S. requests relief that is outside the ICAO's jurisdiction
under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention. 9
As will be shown below, the U.S. has assessed the EU's
suggested avenues to a resolution in this dispute and correctly
determined that the ICAO is the proper forum for a fair and just
settlement. The U.S. has attempted to negotiate with the EU, but
54. Id. at 2.
55. Hearing on the European Union Ban on Aircraft "Hush Kits" Before the
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Aviation Subcommittee, 106th
Cong. (1999) (Prepared Statement of the Equipment Leasing Association (ELA)).
56. Id. at 1.
57. European Union Ban Statement, supra note 46, at 2.
5& See European Union Rejects ICAO as Forum to Resolve Noise Dispute,
supra note 5.
59. Id.
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has met only delay and resistance from the EU. The U.S. has also
correctly determined that the European Court of Justice would not
be a proper forum for resolution by looking at how a European
corporation was treated by a European court involving the same
issues. Finally, a look at Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and
a previous case establishing ICAO jurisdiction will show that the
U.S. correctly concluded that the ICAO is the proper forum for a
fair and just resolution of this dispute.
A. Negotiations
As with any concern or dispute between two nations, the U.S.
began to negotiate with the EU and its member states early in the
dispute.' In answer to U.S. concerns about the EC Regulation, the
EU made unrealistic counter offers and continually stalled to gain
leverage.6' The EU also used language technicalities to claim to the
ICAO that the U.S. had not properly negotiated as required under
Article 84 of the ICAO Convention.62
The European Parliament started work on EC Regulation No.
925/1999 in 1998 and approved it on February 10, 1999.63 This was
an accelerated process for the European Parliament." As early as
September 1998 U.S. Cabinet members met with their EU counter-
parts to discuss the regulation's ramifications.6 These Cabinet
members, as well as U.S. ambassadors, requested that the EU not
ratify the proposed regulation until further discussions could be
held.& In February 1999 the U.S. Transportation Secretary sent a
letter to the EC Transportation Commissioner addressing U.S.
concerns. 67 These are just a few examples of the United States'
60. See U.S. Trade Agreement Compliance Before the Senate Finance
Committee, 106th Cong. (1999) (Prepared Statement of the Honorable David L.
Aaron Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade) [hereinfter U.S.
Trade Agreement Statement].
61. See European Union Rejects ICAO as Forum to Resolve Noise Dispute,
supra note 5.
62. See Press Release, European Report, EU/United States: Effort To Block
Hushkits Appeal Fails (Nov. 22, 2000) [hereinafter EU/United States: Effort To
Block Hushkits Appeal Fails].
63. U.S. Trade Agreement Statement, supra note 60, at 5.
64. Id.
65. Future-Economic Partnership with Europe Before the House International
Relations Committee, 106th Cong. (1999) (Prepared Statement of Ambassador
David L. Aaron Under Secretary for International Trade U.S. Department of
Commerce) [hereinafter Economic Partnership Statement].
66. U.S. Trade Agreement Statement, supra note 60, at 5.
67. European Union Rejects ICAO as Forum to Resolve Noise Dispute, supra
note 5.
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early and conscientious efforts to avert the dispute through
negotiations.
While the EU has responded to U.S. concerns about its
regulation, these responses have not adequately addressed those
concerns. On April 29, 1999, the EU Council adopted EC
Regulation No. 925/1999, making it law. 6 In response to the U.S.
request that the EU not ratify the regulation, the EU postponed the
implementation of the regulation until May 2000.69 This action by
the EU did not address a major U.S. concern. The delayed
implementation of the regulation by one year did not eliminate the
detrimental effect the regulation has on the market value of aircraft
covered by the regulation. The regulation was still law and aircraft
operators still had to factor in the regulations effect on the value of
their long-term investments in aircraft.
The EU then proposed that if the U.S. would agree on
common objectives for the upcoming ICAO conference on future
aircraft noise standards, the EU would suspend the regulation. °
The U.S. could not agree to the EU objectives because those
objectives basically adopted the disputed regulations objectives,
which were objectionable to the U.S. to begin with.71 In addition,
the suspension of the regulation would not give the relief the U.S.
requested because the regulation would still be on the books, thus
still threatening aircraft market value and aircraft operators'
investments.72 Because of the long-term investment required to buy
and operate aircraft, it would take a complete repeal of the
regulation to fully alleviate the regulation's effect.
Finally, the EU claims that the U.S. did not properly negotiate
before filing a complaint with the ICAO. The EU claims that the
negotiations had not addressed the disputed regulations compliance
with the current ICAO noise standards as required by Article 84.73
The EU contends that the negotiations up to this point only focused
on U.S. economic concerns. 1 In fact, the U.S. has addressed its
concerns about the regulation going beyond the ICAO standards
on several occasions during the negotiations.75
68. Economic Partnership Statement, supra note 65, at 4.
69. Id.
70. James Ott, Europe Seeks New Noise Standard, AVIATON WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Jan. 1, 2001, at 53.
71. European Union Rejects ICAO as Forum to Resolve Noise Dispute, supra
note 5.
72. European Union Ban Statement, supra note 46.
73. EU/United States: Effort To Block Hushkits Appeal Fails, supra note 62.
74. Id.
75. European Union Ban Statement, supra note 46.
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The U.S. has attempted to negotiate in good faith with the EU
but has encountered only resistance and delay from the EU. The
EU has stalled the negotiations and delayed ICAO action over this
dispute in order to influence the agenda for upcoming conferences
on new ICAO aircraft noise standards."6 In essence, the EU has not
negotiated in good faith up to this point and will not unless pushed
by another influential international entity.
B. European Court of Justice as Forum for Resolution
The EU asserts that the U.S. must use avenues to resolution
outside the ICAO before going to the ICAO for resolution.77 They
insist that the U.S. could seek a resolution through a European
court such as the European Court of Justice.7 ' The EU holds out as
an example the case of Omega Air, an Ireland-based hushkit
installer.79 While Omega Air's case did get referred to the
European Court of Justice, the Chairman of the company stated
that "for the EU to use my court case against [the U.S.] as an
example of how to resolve this issue is laughable." 8 The Omega
Air Chairman went on to say that "[tihe Commission made every
attempt to kill my court case before it got to the courts, and even
disputed the judgments of both the Irish and British legal
,,81systems .... ,8
A look at the British opinion that referred the Omega Air case
to the European Court of Justice will be instructive as to how well
the U.S. would fair in the same forum. The case involves
complaints by Omega Air about EC Regulation 925/1999 that are
similar to those filed by the U.S. with the ICAO.' Omega Air
claimed that "[t]he effect of the art. 2 definition [of Regulation
76. European Union Rejects ICAO as Forum to Resolve Noise Dispute, supra
note 5.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. European Union Rejects ICAO as Forum to Resolve Noise Dispute, supra
note 5.
82. The relief that Omega Air requested was stated in the opinion as follows:
Pursuant to Permission granted by Mr. Justice Maurice Kay on 15 June
1999, the applicant seeks a reference to the European Court of Justice for
annulment of Council reg EC No 925/1999 insofar as its purpose to
extend its restrictions to aeroplanes completely re-engined, with engines
having a by-pass ratio (bpr) of less than 3 (thus catching Omega's
aeroplanes) as invalid.
R v Sec'y of State for the Env't, Transp. and Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd
(Queen's Bench Division Nov. 25, 1999), at 1.
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925/1999] is to prevent the applicant's re-engined 707s from being
operated in the EU and thus making them commercially unviable
for potential customers."' Omega Air claimed five grounds for the
relief it requested, most of which were rejected. '
The first claim contends that the EC Regulation 925/1999 does
not state the reasons why it was drafted the way it was. 5
Specifically, Omega Air contends that the regulation did not give a
reason for adopting a by-pass ratio of 3.0 as the standard instead of
the decibel standard established by the ICAO.' On this ground,
the Court states that in its "judgment, there is plainly a strong
argument that the Regulation offends art. 253" of the EC treaty.'
While the Court referred Omega Air's complaint to the European
Court of Justice on this ground, it would not necessarily be a
ground that the U.S. could use. This ground rests on a requirement
of a treaty (the EC Treaty) that the U.S. is not a party to.
Therefore, the U.S. may have a difficult time invoking the same
provision that Omega Air, a European based corporation, invoked.
The second ground rested on the principle that the regulation
is discriminatory.' Omega Air claims that the regulation is
discriminatory because it restricts them from re-engining aircraft
with engines that would be permitted by the regulation if they were
on the aircraft when it was new.89 The court rejected this argument
on the grounds that it is far different to require aircraft operators to
remove engines at an extreme expense than it is to prevent the
introduction of new engines.9' There is nothing in the opinion to
indicate that the U.S. would fare any better on this argument in a
European court.
The Court also rejected Omega Air's third ground. It was
based on the EC treaty's requirement that any EC action "shall not
go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this
Treaty."' The court stated that without knowing the reason for the
regulation (which was Omega Air's first ground) the court could
83. Id. at 2.
84. Omega Air initially filed six grounds but withdrew the sixth ground during
the trial. See Id.
85. The treaty establishing the EU states that "[r]egulations... adopted
jointly by the European Parliament and the Council shall state the reasons on
which they are based." Id. at 5.
86. Id. at 10.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 10.
90. Id. at 11.
91. Id.
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not determine if the regulation was proportional to its purpose.'
As stated previously, the U.S. would have an even more difficult
time, than a European corporation would, of winning this argument
in a European court.
The rejection of the fourth ground is very instructive of how
difficult it would be for a non-EU member to win such a case in an
EU court. Omega Air's fourth ground invoked the principle of
legitimate expectation.93 This ground was based on Omega Air's
expectation that the EU would follow the ICAO noise standards,
and that Omega Air invested vast sums on that expectation. This
argument was rejected by the court because the EU is not a party to
the ICAO convention; therefore, it is not bound by ICAO
standards and Omega Air should not have relied on the fact that
they would.94 The court held this even though all EU members are
signatories to the ICAO Convention. In other words, each EU
member can be held to the ICAO standards individually, but
collectively as the EU they cannot. Obviously the U.S. would fare
no better in a European court than Omega Air did.
The Court agreed to forward Omega Air's fifth ground based
on the World Trade Organization (WTO) because of conflicting
interpretation of the WTO treaty and its predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 9 However, there is nothing in
this court's opinion to indicate that the European Court of Justice
would rule in Omega Air's or the United States' favor on this issue.
While Omega Air is going on to the European Court of Justice
to try and gain relief from EC Regulation 925/1999, it is on only two
weak grounds. While the U.S. may have been able to argue other
grounds to the European Court of Justice, it is clear from the
Omega Air case that the EU courts will use every technicality to
advance their agenda and uphold this regulation.
C. Article 84 of the ICAO Convention
As demonstrated above, the U.S. has not been able to get their
concerns about EC Regulation 925/1999 alleviated through high
level negotiations and would not be able to get a fair hearing in a
European court. Therefore, the U.S. properly turned to the ICAO,
92. Id. at 12.
93. Id. "[T]he applicant relied on the fact that all EU Member States had
supported ICAO Resolution A31.11,... and which relates to the possible
operating restrictions on subsonic jet aircraft" when they made investments in
aircraft. Id.
94. Id. at 13.
95. Id. at 14.
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the organization responsible for establishing international aviation
standards. Article 84 is the provision of the ICAO Convention that
gives the ICAO jurisdiction over certain disputes between contract-
ing states. This provision has been upheld by the International
Court of Justice in cases that established the jurisdiction of the
ICAO Council in Article 84 disputes, one of which will be discussed
below.'
1. Article 84Y-Article 84 establishes the power of the
ICAO to settle disputes between multiple contracting states.9
While in the present dispute the EU is not a contracting state to the
ICAO, its members are. Thus, the U.S. had to name each EU
member state and not the EU in its Article 84 complaint to the
ICAO.99 The Article only gives power to the ICAO Council to
settle issues involving "the interpretation or application of [the]
Convention and its Annexes."1" In the present case the dispute is
over how the European contracting states have applied Annex 16
to the ICAO Convention. Article 84 has an additional constraint
that the ICAO cannot intervene until the parties to the dispute
have attempted to negotiate a settlement. As demonstrated above,
this requirement has been met in the present case.
With all of the above conditions met, one or more of the
parties to the dispute can ask the ICAO Council to settle the
dispute. The ICAO Council is made up of 33 of the 185 ICAO
96. "In the history of ICAO, there have been only 4 other Article 84 actions
filed-two between India and Pakistan, one between the UK and Spain regarding
Gibraltar, and one between Cuba and the US." Testimony Development of
Reduced-Noise Aircraft Before the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee Aviation Subcommittee, 106th Cong. (2000) (Prepared Testimony of
Ambassador Edward W. Stimpson U.S. Representative on the Council,
International Civil Aviation Organization), at 3.
97. Below is the full text of Article 84 of the ICAO Convention:
If any disagreement between two or more contracting States relating to
the interpretation or application of this Convention and its Annexes
cannot be settled by negotiation, it shall, on the application of any State
concerned in the disagreement, be decided by the Council. No member
of the Council shall vote in the consideration by the Council of any
dispute to which it is a party. Any contracting State may, subject to
Article 85, appeal from the decision of the Council to an ad hoc arbitral
tribunal agreed upon with the other parties to the dispute or to the
Permanent Court of International Justice. Any such appeal shall be
notified to the Council within sixty days of receipt of notification of the
decision of the Council.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., supra note 19.
98. Id.
99. EU/United States: Effort to Block Hushkits Appeal Fails, supra note 62.
100. Int'l Civil Aviation Org., supra note 19.
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contracting states. 1 If the ICAO Council cannot resolve the
dispute the issue goes before the entire 185 ICAO contracting
states for settlement."°2 Another condition that Article 84 imposes
is that "[n]o member of the Council shall vote in the consideration
by the Council of any dispute to which it is a party."'0 3  This
condition could affect the ICAO Council outcome because neither
the U.S. nor any European member of the ICAO Council can vote
on the resolution of the dispute. The Article goes on to establish a
procedure to appeal any ICAO decision.
One of the EU's answers to the U.S. Article 84 complaint was
that it asked for a remedy that was beyond the scope of Article
84." While the Article does state that it deals with disputes
concerning interpretation and application, it does not delineate any
specific remedies that the ICAO Council can use.' The lack of
specific remedies does not put the elimination of the disputed
regulation beyond the scope of the Article. Implicit in the right of
the ICAO Council to settle disputes involving the application of
ICAO Annexes is the right of the ICAO Council to change or
invalidate any regulation improperly applying an Annex.
Therefore, it is not beyond the scope of the ICAO Council to
instruct its European contracting states to repeal EC Regulation
No. 925/1999 as the U.S. has requested.
2. India v. Pakistan.'-The first case that established ICAO
Council jurisdiction over a dispute involving the ICAO Convention
and its Annexes was a dispute between India and Pakistan. This
dispute arose out of a war between these two nations and India's
subsequent denial of over-flight rights to Pakistan.1' India claimed
101. Elaine Hills, EC Fails In ICAO Hushkit Ban Bid, FLIGHT INT'L, Nov. 28,
2000, at 6.
102 Id.
103. Int'l Civil Aviation Org., supra note 19.
104. Hills, supra note 101.
105. Int'l Civil Aviation Org., supra note 19.
106. Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v.
Pakistan), 1972 I.C.J. 46.
107. The complaint as described in the opinion of the I.C.J.:
Appeal from decisions of the Council of the International Civil Aviation
Organization assuming jurisdiction in respect of an 'Application' and a
'Complaint' made to it by Pakistan concerning the suspension by India, in
alleged breach of the 1944 Chicago International Civil Aviation
Convention and International Air Services Transit Agreement, of flights
of Pakistan civil aircraft over Indian territory-Competence of the Court
to entertain this appeal-Interpretation of the jurisdictional clauses of
these instruments-Jurisdiction of the Council to entertain the dispute
between India and Pakistan-Question of whether this dispute involved a
'disagreement... relating to the interpretation or application' of the
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that because of the war, a treaty issued under the ICAO
Convention giving Pakistan permission to over-fly India was no
longer in existence.1" Pakistan filed an Article 84 complaint
disputing India's interpretation of the treaty.
109
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that the
question it was resolving in the case was whether there was an
"existence of a dispute of such a character as to amount to a
'disagreement... relating to the interpretation or application' of
the Chicago Convention .... "10 For if it found that there was such
a dispute, then the ICAO would have jurisdiction.1"' India
contended that since the treaty at issue was no longer in existence
the ICAO Council could not interpret the treaty; therefore, it did
not have jurisdiction."' The ICJ did not agree with India's
argument because it was up to the ICAO Council to interpret the
treaty to determine if it was nullified or not."3 In a vote of fourteen
to two the ICJ held that the ICAO Council did have jurisdiction
over the complaint.1
4
In the present dispute there is no question that the regulation
at issue involves the application of Annex 16 to the ICAO
Convention. Therefore, as the ICJ found in the India v. Pakistan
case, the ICAO Council, through Article 84, has jurisdiction. Now
it is up to the ICAO Council to hear the merits of each side's case
and decide on a proper settlement to the dispute. If, after the
ICAO Council issues its order, the EU believes that order is
beyond the ICAO Council's scope of authority, then the EU can
appeal the decision.
IV. Conclusion
As the Chairman for the Coalition for a Global Standard on
Aviation Noise, former Virginia Governor, Gerald Baliles, said,
"[t]he infamous hushkit dispute can be a footnote in history, or it
can be a template for future international aviation relations. It all
depends on whether we use this opportunity to settle the issues.
Chicago Convention and Transit Agreement-Alleged irregularities in the
procedure of the Council-Relevance of this question to the task of the
Court in the present case.
Id. at 46.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 61.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 65.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 70.
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The ICAO process represents our best chance to do this and I
believe that the chance must be seized.".... The ICAO is the
international organization that is charged with establishing inter-
national standards for the aviation industry. Without international
standards the international aviation industry would collapse.
Aviation's unique benefit to the people of the world is its ability to
seamlessly travel to anywhere in a short period of time. Without
international standards seamless world travel would disappear.
Unilateral and isolationist regulations, like EC Regulation No.
925/1999, must not be allowed to disrupt the seamless travel the
world has come to expect. As Louise Maillett, the FAA Deputy
Assistant Administrator, put it, "there is a strong temptation for
governments to look for quick fixes outside of the international
process. These unilateral actions open the door for balkanization
of international civil aviation standards and regulations, and could
destroy the very stability that has allowed the industry to
thrive....""'
The ICAO must be the organization to maintain a cohesive
policy in an industry that must transcend boundaries to fully realize
its potential. The U.S. has attempted to negotiate in good faith
with the EU, without any progress. Any attempt to settle this
dispute in a European court would only cause delay without a
definitive solution to the underlying issues in this dispute. The U.S.
properly chose to take this dispute to the one organization that can
definitively settle this dispute and still maintain the universal
standards that are required for all nations' aviation industries to
prosper.
Kriss E. Brown
115. Graeme Osbom, The 'Hushkit War' Between Europe and the USA is No
Nearer Compromise, FLIGHT INT'L, Dec. 12, 2000 at 45.
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